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THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO LEVY TAXES
FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THE STATES
E. M. PERKINS*

Twenty-five years ago Professor Seligman suggested a plan of
federal collection of taxes and distribution of the proceeds to the
states. His proposal was that the corporation income tax and the
inheritance tax should be administered by the federal government
and that the revenue should be apportioned in whole or in part among
the states. Had he believed that the states needed fhe revenue from
a personal income tax, it appears that his proposal would have included that also; as it was, he recommended federal administration
and expenditure for this tax. The difficulties of state administration
were the inability to localize income, the danger of double taxation,
the complications of interstate commerce, and the ease of a shift of
residence to escape income and inheritance taxes. "The question of
the constitutionality of the scheme that I have suggested," he wrote,
"may be left to the lawyers. My own opinion, expressed with all
due diffidence, is that a constitutional method can be devised. But
my additional opinion, expressed without any diffidence, is that if
constitutional methods cannot be devised, the sooner a constitutional
amendment is procured the better it will be. I can see no other
avenue of escape from the difficulties that are looming up on all
sides." 1
In the intervening quarter-century some of the difficulties have
partly subsided; others have arisen. The clause of the federal estate
tax which allows the taxpayer a credit on his federal tax for taxes
2
paid to the states has largely eliminated inheritance tax havens.
Court decisions, especially on inheritance taxes, have so marked out
* Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina.
'Seligman, The Relations of State and Federal Finance (1909) STATE AND
LOCAL TAXAToN-TIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 213, 224.

'Decedents' estates are allowed a credit up to eighty per cent of the federal
estate tax of 1926 for any estate or inheritance tax paid to the states. 44 STAT.
70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §1093 (1928). When first adopted in 1924 this credit
was limited to twenty-five per cent, but was increased to eighty per cent in
1926. 43 STAT. 304 (1924). The additional federal estate tax enacted in 1932

does not allow a credit in respect of such additional tax. 47 STAT. 245 (1932),
26 U. S.C. A. §1093 (1932). See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup.
Ct. 265, 71 L. ed. 511 (1927); Rouse v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 749 (1928).
Machen, The Strange Case of Florida v. Mellon (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 351.
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the states' taxing jurisdiction as to decrease double taxation., On
the other hand, although the income tax states are growing in number, 4 so long as there are states without income taxes and so long as
the tax laws are diverse, individuals and corporations will conduct
their affairs to take advantage of these opportunities.5 Wealth and
income have become increasingly, the product of national activity and
consequently the problems of allocation are more troublesome.8
Domicile, so important in determining jurisdiction to tax, has less
economic and social significance. 7 As the volume of interstate commerce has expanded the problem of its partial immunity from taxation has grown in importance. 8 In addition to these, recent years
'Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct.

256, 70 L. ed. 475 (1926); Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272
U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. 202, 71 L. ed. 413 (1926) ; Farmers Loan and Trust Co.
v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. ed. 371 (1930); Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. ed. 1056 (1930); Beidler v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54, 75 L. ed. 131
(1930) ; First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U., S.312, 52 Sup. Ct.
174, 76 L. ed. 313 (1932); see Safe Deposit and. Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280
U. S.83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180 (1929).
' At the present time (April 1934) twenty-nine states tax the incomes either
of corporations or of individuals, and twenty-six states levy a tax on both....
More than half of the American commonwealths have adopted this form of
taxation since Wisconsin, a little more than two decades ago, first developed
the plan of central administration." Martin, State Income Taxes (1934) 7
STATE GOVERNMENT, No. 4. See, New State Tax Laws (1933) 11 TAX MAGAZINE 183; Groves, Recent State Income Taxation in the United States (1934)
12 TAX MAGAZINE 107.
"See Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis. 1930) aff'd 56
F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 48
F. (2d) 801 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) certioraridenied, 284 U. S.655, 52 Sup. Ct.
34, 76 L. ed. 556 (1931); Breckenridge, Tax Escapes by Manipulations of
Holding Company (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 189.
'See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S.113, 41 Sup. Ct.
45, 65 L. ed. 165 (1920) ; Hans Rees' Sons Inc. v. State of North Carolina, 283
U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L. ed. 879 (1931); Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey
Mfg. Co., 204 N. C. 365, 168 S.E. 397 (1933) aff'd 54 Sup. Ct. 437 (1934) ;
Magill, Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract (1931) 44 HARV. L. REV.
-935; Huston, Allocation of Corporate Net Income for Purposes of Taxation
(1932) 26 ILL.L. Rxv. 725; Ford, The Allocation of Corporate Income for the
Purpose of State Taxation (1933) SPECIAL REPoRT No. 6 OF THE NEW YoRE:
STATE TAX Comemissiox; notes (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1273; (1931) 9 N. C. L.
REV. 470.
1 Peppin, The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles or Their Transfer
(1930) 18 CALIF. L. REV. 638; Mason, Jurisdictionfor the Purpose of Imposing Inheritance Taxes (1931) 29 MIca. L. REv. 324; Lowndes, Bases of Jurisdiction, in State Taxation of Inheritance and Property (1931) 29 Mica. L.
REV. 850; Rottschaefer, The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles (1931)
9 N. C. L. REv. 415; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 HAav. L. REv. 1075; Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 305; see also supra note 3.
8 A number of bills providing for Congressional permission to the states to
tax interstate commerce have been introduced in Congress in recent years. In
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have brought troubles of their own. A new development has been
the increasing utilization of the same sources of revenue by the state
and federal governments. The states have invaded the tobacco tax
field which the federal government regarded as. its resource. 9 And
gasoline, which the states considered as theirs, has been subjected to
a federal tax.1o With the return of legal intoxicants both the states
and the nation have seized upon this source to help out their revenues.
Another development is the adoption of general sales taxes by a number of stzites with the discovery that the Commerce Clause contributes
to the prevention of their completely effective application. 1 These
are all problems in the collection of taxes. They involve the danger
the Seventy-third Congress there have been introduced: H. R. 3360 and H. R.
6164, which would grant consent to the states to levy all types of taxes on
interstate' commerce; H. R. 8231 and H. P. 8303, which would grant consent
to the states to tax certain sales made, in interstate commerce; H. R. 8913,
which is a combination of the two above mentioned types of bills; and H. R.
1639 which would impose federal privilege taxes on manufacturing for sale in
interstate commerce and on selling articles in interstate commerce. S. 2897,

which is similar to H. P. 8231 and H. R.8303 and would permit the states to

tax certain sales made in interstate commerce, was passed by the Senate on
March 15, 1934. 78 CONG. REc. 4695.
'In 1933 fourteen states had taxes on tobacco. Table I (1933) 11 TAx
MAGAZINE 122. "Fourteen states now have taxes on tobacco, and many other
states are seriously considering levying such taxes. If the states continue to
impose additional levies on tobacco products, the return to the Federal Government from this source of revenue will be further diminished. Since any material increase in these taxes during a period of depression will decrease the
amount of tobacco consumed, such increase will adversely affect the producer
as well as the manufacturer. Accordingly this Commission recommends that
no additional tobacco taxes be adopted by the states for revenue purposes."
Heer, The Interstate Comnmssion on Conflicting Taxation (1933) 11 TAX
MAGAZINE 218.
" 76 CoNG. Rzc. 2898, January 30, 1933. "Mr. Warren. I happen to be one
who thinks this particular tax [the federal gasoline tax] is a most unwarranted
transgression, we might say, on the rights of the States. I wonder if the committee, headed by the gentleman, is considering making this Federal tax a
permanent thing.
"Mr. Collier. Without agreeing to the gentleman's premise as to this being
distinctly a state- matter, I may say they did beat us to it. There has been
much pro and con discussion about that. I do not care to go into any argument of the matter, but the states have invaded the Federal Government field
in the taxing of cigarettes and other things .... In answer to the gentleman's
question in regard to the permanency of this tax, I may say to the gentleman
from North Carolina that this question was asked the commnittee a number of
times during the hearing.... I can not tell what the condition of the Treasury
will be a year from now, nor what a future Congress may do, but it is not the
intention of the present committee to make this a permanent tax. It is only an
emergency matter." See, State Preserves (1934) 7 STATE GOVERNMENT 3.
1 Graves, Federal Sales Tax weith Allocation of Share of Proceeds to the
States (1933) 11 TAX MAGAZINE 372; HEER, A STATE-SHARED FEDERAL SALES
TAX, RESEARCH REPORT FOR INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CONFLICTING TAX-

ATION (1934) ; Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions it Interstate Commerce (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 99.
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of interstate tax competition; the danger that the state legislatures
and Congress acting independently of the legislation of the other
will burden a subject with heavier taxes than it should pay; the
futility of small governmental units exacting tolls from an economic
life that generally is unaware of state boundaries; and the waste of
duplicate administration of the same taxes by the states and by the
federal government.
This situation has led to recent proposals for federal collection
and sharing with the states of the inheritance tax, the corporation
and personal income taxes, the tobacco, gasoline and liquor taxes, and
12
a general sales tax.
Last year Congressman R. L. Doughton, of North Carolina,
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, introduced in the
House of Representatives a resolution which would direct the Secretary of the Treasury to allocate and pay to the states according to
their population, one-sixth of the proceeds from the federal cigarette
tax. It provided that the payment should be made to a state only in
the event that neither it nor any of its subdivisions imposed any tax
on the manufacture or sale of cigarettes.12 The preamble to the
I See, Graves, stpra note 11; Haig, Federal Tax Collections with Allocation
of Share of Proceeds to the States (1933) 11 TAX MAGAZINE 95; HEER, mpra
note 11; Seligman, The Fiscal Outlook and the Codrdination of Public Revenues, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC FINANCE (1933) 261; The National Tax
Association Conference (1933) 11 TAX MAGAZINE 416; cf. Elwell, Proposed
Surrender of State Taxing Power (1933) 11 TAX MAGAZINE 176.
I- H. J. Res. 546, introduced January 10, 1933, would provide, "That (a)
upon cigarettes made of tobacco, or any substitute therefor, and weighing not
more than three pounds per thousand, manufactured in or imported into the
United States, which on or after the date of enactment of this Joint Resolution,
are sold by the manufacturer or importer, or removed for consumption or sale,
there shall be levied, collected and paid under the provisions of existing law in
lieu of the Revenue Act of 1926, a tax of $3 per thousand, to be paid by the
manufacturer or importer thereof. As used in this subsection, the term 'United
States' includes only the States, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, and the
District of Columbia.
"(b) As soon as practicable after June 30 and December 31 of each year
the Secretary of the Treasury shall ascertain the amount collected from the
tax imposed by subsection (a) during the six months' period ending on such
date and the amount of refunds and stamp redemptions during such period in
respect of such tax. He shall then allocate to the several States, according to
their population as shown by the last preceding decennial census, one-sixth of
the net amount of the collections thus ascertained. The amount allocated to
each State shall be paid to the Treasurer of such State by the Secretary immediately upon the making of such allocation, if he finds that neither such
State nor any of its municipalities or political subdivisions (1) has imposed,
collected, or had in force any excise. occupational or other tax or, fee on the
manufacture or sale of cigarettes during such six months' period, or (2) has
had in force during such period any prohibition on the manufacture of cigarettes or on the sale thereof to adults, or (3) has in force any law, statute, or
ordinance imposing such a tax or fee or providing such a prohibition in respect
of any later period!'
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resolution recited that the state taxes had impaired cigarette sales
and contributed to a reduction in the revenue of the federal government and that to protect the federal revenue an adjustment between
the tax programs of the federal government and the states was necessary. The resolution was referred to the Ways and Means Committee but no action was taken.
At the Congressional hearings on the taxation of intoxicating
liquor, in December 1933, similar proposals for federal collection
and apportionment of liquor taxes were considered but met defeat,
due in part, it seems, to the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory
method of apportionment. The question of apportionment here was
very perplexing because some states that are wet are not entirely wet
and it was thought that the population factor in an apportionment
formula should be only the wet population of the state and there
Seemed to be Some difficulties in ascertaining that. Another problem
was the inclusion of a factor that would satisfy the liquor production
states. It was suggested that some states which are dry in that they
do not permit the sale of liquor and so would not benefit from federal distribution on the basis of a wetness determined by the possibility of sale, still might permit the manufacture of liquor and by
levying production taxes they could disrupt the plan for limited tax-"
ation. So it was believed that a production factor should be included
to allure these states. 14 This indicates the complexity of an undertaking for federal distribution. The impotence of the states in the
collection of taxes and the federal government's eminent position for
this task suggests federal collection. But collection is only half of
the puzzle, and it seems that federal collection may be successful
only if a satisfactory scheme of distribution can be devised.
At the present time the larger part of the federal revenue is collected in a small number of states. 15 The smoker in Montana or
"JOINT HEARINGS ON THE TAX ON INTOXICATING LIQUOR, WAYS AND
MEANS CoMMITrEE AND SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, December 11-14, 1933.
Federal-StateLiason (1934) 7 STATE GOVmERMENT, No. 1; Heer, Splitting the
Liquor Taxes (1933) 6 STATE GOVERNMENT, No. 12.

According to the annual report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1933, 56.42 per cent of the internal-revenue

receipts were in that fiscal year collected in five states. These were: New

York, $376,346,672, 23.23 per cent; North Carolina, $213,487,759, 13.18 per
cent; Pennsylvania, $114,254,637, 7.05 per cent; Illinois, $106,114,822, 6.55 per
cent; Virginia, $103,798,963, 6.41 per cent. And with the addition of five other
states, the receipts for the ten were 77.68 per cent of the total. The additional
five were: California, $94,674,183, 5.85 per cent; New Jersey, $71,475,600, 4.41
per cent; Ohio, $69,477,801, 4.29 per cent; Michigan, $54,373,207, 3.36 per cent;
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Mississippi pays part of the tobacco tax but the collections are made
largely in North Carolina and Virginia. 16 So too with the income
tax,--the collections are made in New York and Pennsylvania but
the people living in other states contribute to the incomes that are
taxed. 17 Suppose the federal government undertook to collect income, inheritance, sales, gasoline, liquor and tobacco taxes and return
part of the revenue to the states in which collected. Certainly New
York would welcome that for the income tax, as would North Carolina for the tobacco tax. Other states might not fare as well. One
of the advantages of federal collection of a sales tax or of the gasoline, tobacco or liquor taxes is that the tax can be applied to the
manufacturer or producer and the work of collecting is greatly reduced. As a result in many states little would be collected and little
returned. The consumers in these states would pay a sales tax and
the other taxes but a disproportionate amount of collections would
occur in a few states. The same is true of the income tax and the
inheritance tax, though the partial payment of these taxes in one
state by the contributions of other states is less apparent. Collections
as such, then, would not be a satisfactory measure of apportionment.
Kentucky, $54,130,054, 3.34 per cent. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

1933, at 60.
In the debate on the Fess-Kenyon Bill for vocational rehabilitation Senator
Kenyon made these remarks: "Mr. President, I do not believe I have heard an
appropriation bill or tax bill under discussion before the Senate for the last
two or three years that I have not heard practically that same argument from
the Senator from New Jersey-that it is an unfair distribution of public funds,
that we are putting it into the South, and that the great industrial centers of
REVENUE FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,

New Jersey and New York are paying more than their share ....

Of course

you have more money in New Jersey than certain States in the South have.
You have there a great industrial center, and you have to pay more taxes. Perhaps New Jersey does pay more taxes than Iowa, though New Jersey could
not live if it were not for Iowa, and some of the Western States and some of
the Southern States. We have gotten to the point, I hope, in this country where
the welfare of the Southern States is as important to us as the welfare of the
Northern States. We are one country. I am growing rather tired, when
anything comes up here of this nature, of always being confronted with the
proposition that New York and New Jersey are paying all the taxes in the
country, and consequently we must have some different method of distribution
of funds. Let us get over the idea that we are anything but one country."
58 CONG. Rnc. 516 (1919).
'"Tobacco tax collections in North Carolina, Virginia and Kentucky for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 1933 were 83.55 per cent of the total. These were:
North Carolina, $199,511,718, 49.53 per cent; Virginia, $92,380,436, 22.93 per
cent; Kentucky, $44,655,917, 11.09 per cent.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER,

supra note 15, at 36.
' Income tax collections in New York for the fiscal year ended June 30,
1933 were $240,001,792, or 32.14 per cent of the total income tax collections;
Pennsylvania, $65,354,910, 8.75 per cent; Illinois, $56,453,099, 7.55 per cent;
California, $50,473,239, 6.75 per cent. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER, supra
note 15, at 60.
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It would be possible to ascertain from the manufacttrers and distributors roughly the volume of gasoline, tobacco and liquor consumed in each state, and apportionment could be based on consumption. The same method could be used for apportioning the sales tax.
For the latter the determination of consumption would be more difficult because the agencies reporting on consumption, the manufacturers and distributors, would be more numerous, but this would not
be impossible. It would, however, be impossible to determine what
part of the income tax and inheritance tax was contributed by each
state. Of course the amount collected in each state is known, but
collections are not a fair measure of contribution. It cannot be known
how much the economic life in one state contributes to the incomes
and fortunes that are accumulated in another.
The methods of distribution discussed above are attempts to return to each state an amount proportionate to the taxes paid by the
economic life of the state. Opposed to this is the view that the sharing should be on a basis which will engender an equality in governmental advantages. This view emphasizes the national character of
our life. It denies that it is either possible or desirable to compute
what a state contributes to the federal revenues. It says that the
farmer in Georgia or Iowa contributes to the incomes taxed in New
York and Illinois. It says that the resident of one state should have
the same quality of governmental service enjoyed by the resident of
another.' 8 Population, according to this view, should be the measure
of distribution.
Precisely, this plan in its more comprehensive form involves the
withdrawal of the states from the income, inheritance, tobacco, gasoline, liquor and sales tax fields, the imposition of these taxes by the
federal government and the distribution of a part of the revenue to
the states in proportion to their population. Obviously it involves
momentous changes in state and federal finance. The functions of
the states and their obligations have been undertaken with the expectation of a fairly steady revenue from certain taxes. The loss of
a source of revenue without a commensurate return might seriously
disrupt a state's fiscal program. 19
"s If this equality of service proposal could be followed consistently, it
would call for federal expenditure as theoretically assuring more an equality
between different communities and different classes of citizens than is true of

state expenditure. Still, it can be argued that the state governments are better

qualified to respond to the governmental needs of a community. Also it
would be politically impossible to so abruptly and completely abolish the states.

"It appears that a few states which now tax cigarettes might not receive
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The task of devising a satisfactory plan of distribution is far
the most important and troublesome in this field. No pretensions
are here made in that direction. The purpose of this article is to discuss the constitutional question which Professor Seligman left to the
lawyers.
Has Congress the power to distribute revenues to the states?
Slightly different in emphasis, has Congress the power to levy taxes
for distribution to the states? The subject is not a new one in our
financial history. It was a hundred years ago that the federal government did in effect distribute twenty-eight million dollars among
the states. In 1829 President Jackson had predicted that in a short
time the national debt would be extinguished and after that it was
probable that the Treasury would have a considerable surplus. He

suggested that the surplus be apportioned among the states and
thought that if this were considered unconstitutional a constitutional
amendment authorizing it should be proposed to the states. 20 The
surplus which materialized was due to the unwillingness to reduce
the tariff and to the increasing revenue from the sale of public
lands. 21 A Senate committee estimated in 1835 that there would be
as much under the Doughton resolution as they now obtain from their own

taxes. Table I (1933) 11

TAX MAGAZINE

122. Some states have developed

the gasoline tax more intensively than others. A division of this tax according
to population would return more to some than they receive at present; others
would lose. In the main the more populous states would gain, while some of
the sparsely settled would suffer. On the other hand, the losses of the less
densely populated states from the gasoline tax distribution would be more than
replenished by a division of the income and inheritance taxes, since generally
the more sparsely settled a state the fewer and smaller the income tax returns. The same should be true of the sales tax. The poorer states would
buy less per capita than the more populous and wealthy states. Stumblingblocks to apportionment of the liquor tax have been noted already. Wet
states would object to sharing this tax on a basis of population with dry states
or with states that are only slightly wet. This situation may require that the
liquor tax be distributed according to consumption, information for which would
be obiained from the manufacturers and distributors. There is not this peculiar
situation with regard to the other taxes. F6r these, population may be a more
roughly satisfactory measure.
12 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (1896) 452. In
his second inaugural address in 1805 President Jefferson also suggested distribution to the states. Speaking of the duties on imports he said, "These contributions enable us to support the current expenses of the Government, to
fulfill contracts with foreign nations, to extinguish the native right of soil
within our limits, to extend those limits, and to apply such a surplus to our
public debts as places at a short day their final redemption, and that redemption
once effected the revenue thereby liberated may, by a just repartition of it
among the States and a corresponding amendment of the Constitution, be applied in time of peace to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, education
and other great objects within each State." 1 id. 379.
THE HISTORY OF THE SURPLUS REvENUE OF 1837 (1885)
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1903) §93.

'BOURNE,

DEwEY,

10;
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a surplus of nine million a year for the next eight years. 22 This
committee reported a resolution to so amend the Constitution as to
permit distribution of this particular surplus. 23 The resolution never
came up for a vote. 24 The next year the Senate passed a distribution
bill but when it was seen that the House would not accept distribution pure and simple a plan was devised for depositing the surplus
with the states subject to the call of the Treasury. 28 Although there
seems to have been little expectation that repayment would ever be
asked, 26 this shift apparently satisfied the constitutional views of
many and the bill passed by large majorities.2 7 So in 1837 the surplus was apportioned among the states according to their representation in Congress. They received three installments but financial difficulties prevented the payment of the fourth. 28 Later it was provided
that the first three installments should remain on deposit with the
states until called for by Congress. 29 Perhaps it is unnecessary to
say that no call has been made.
= KNox, UNITED STATES NOTES

(1899)'175;

BENTON, THIRTY YEARS' VIEW

(1854) 557.
• 'The committee, which was headed by Calhoun, reported in part: "Your
committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the distribution
of the surplus revenue among the States, considered as a part of the ordinary
and regular systenz of this government. They admit them to be as great as
can well be imagined. The proposition itself, that the government should collect money for the purpose of distribution, or should distribute a sprplus for
the purpose of perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation; and yet
what would be when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, in the
opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply disordered
state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to the
restoration of the body politic to a sound condition;
YEA&S VIEW (1854) 558.
" 1 BENTON, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 567.

. . ."

BENTON, THIRTY

'Id. at 651. Senator Benton protested, "The constitution by the acknowledgment of many who conduct this bill will not admit of a distribution of the
revenues. Not further back than the last session, and again at the commencement of the present session, a proposition was made to amend the constitution
to permit this identical distribution to be made. That proposition is now upon
our calendar for the action of Congress. All -at once, it is discovered that a
change of names Will do as well as a change of the constitution. Strike out
the word 'distribute' and insert the word 'deposit,' and, incontinently, the impediment is removed; the constitution difficulty is surmounted; the division of
the money can be made. This, at least, is quick work. . . . After all it must be
admitted to be a very compendious mode of amending the constitution, and
such a one as the framers of that instrument never happened to think of."
Id. at 653.
0112 BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGaSS (1859) 774; 12

GALES AND SEATON, REGIsTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS (1836) 4359, 4372.
0 12 BENTON, op. cit. upra note 26, at 773; 12 GALES AND SEATON, Op. cit.

supra note 26 at 4379.
21BouRNE, op. cit. .rpranote 21, at 35; KNOX, op. cit. supra note 22, at 183;

DEvEY, loc. cit. supra note 21.
1 5 STAT. 201 (1837). In 1884 the State of Virginia petitioned for a writ of
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The predominant expression of opinion was that federal dis-

tribution of revenues was unconstitutional.

Proponents of distribu-

30
sometion sought to distinguish the situation as extraordinary,

thing akin to an emergency; also it was argued that the surplus resulted from the sale of public lands and to distribute this would not

32
be a distribution of taxes. 31 Opponents denied these contentions

and talked, as always, of "the principle involved." One has only to
read the protests against distribution a century ago to find expressed

the arguments of today. Senator Benton pictured "the degradation
of mendicant states receiving their annual allowance from the bounty
of the federal government.13 3 President Jackson, who had come to
mandamus upon the Secretary of the Treasury to compel him to pay the fourth
installment. The petition was denied. The Court said that the Acts of 1836
and 1837 had made the installment a charge upon the surplus revenue in the
Treasury on January 1, 1839. On that date there was not sufficient revenue in
the Treasury to meet the installment. And Congress had not, since that time,
made the installment a charge on revenue accruing subsequently. Hence the
Secretary had no authority, without further direction of Congress, to pay the
fourth installment. Also it was said the Act of 1836 "created no debt or legal
obligation upon the part of the government, but only made the States the depositories, temporarily, of a portion of the public revenue not needed as it was
then supposed, for the purposes of the United States." Ex Parte Virginia, 111
U. S. 43, 28 L. ed. 346 (1884).
"I think it safest to treat the present state of things as extraordinary,"
said Daniel Webster, "as being the result of accidental causes, or causes the
recurrence of which hereafter we cannot calculate upon with certainty. There
would be unsuperable objections, in my opinion, to a settled practice of distributing revenue among the States. It would be a strange operation of things,
and its effects on our system of government might well be feared. I cannot
reconcile myself to the spectacle of the States receiving their revenues, their
means even of supporting their own governments, from the Treasury of the
United States." 4 WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER (1851) 256. 3 WORKS OF JOHN
C. CALHOUN (1853) 581. See the report of the committee, supra note 23.
' Henry Clay stated this view, ". . . I unite cordially with those who condemn the application of any principle of distribution among the several States,
to surplus revenue derived from taxation. I think income derived from taxation stands upon ground totally distinct from that which is received from the
public lands. . . The powers of Congress over the public lands are broader
and more comprehensive than those which they possess over taxation and the
money produced by it." 9 BENTON, op. cit. supra note 26, at 495, 509.
3112 GALES AND SEATON, op. cit. supra note 26, at 3859. Benton thus reports
the argument of Senator Wright of New York: "The taxing powers of this
Government were to be used to accumulate money for distribution to the sovereign and independent States of the Confederacy. Those States were to be
taught to look to this Government for the means to supply their wants; for
the money to sustain theirinstitutions; for the funds to meet their legislative
appropriations. Can relations of this sort be established and the independence
of the States be preserved? . . . What step can be so eminently calculated as
this to produce speedy and perfect consolidation?" 12 BENTON, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 765.
1 1 BENTON, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 561. "Sir, I am opposed to the whole
policy of this measure. I am opposed to it as going to sap the foundations of
the Federal Government, and to undo the constitution, and that by evasion in
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regret his earlier suggestion of distribution, warned that "The proportion may be increased from time to time, without any departure
from the principle now asserted, until the State governments shall
derive all the funds necessary for their support from the Treasury
of the United States, or if a sufficient supply should be obtained by
some States and not by others, the deficient States might complain;
and to put an end to all further difficulty Congress, without assuming
any new principle, need go but one step further and put the salaries
of all State governors, judges, and other officers, with a sufficient
sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill."84 Senator Hayne a few years earlier had queried, "The gentleman . . .
advocated the passage of his bill, on the. ground that it would be
easier for the Federal Government to raise this revenue and return
it, than it would be for each State to raise sufficient for its own purposes; but, when the constitution was formed, was it ever imagined
that the States would require the aid of the Federal Government to
levy taxes for domestic purposes within their individual boundaries ?"35 Clay, Webster and Calhoun, although supporting distributhe very point for which the constitution was made. What is that point? A
Treasury l A Treasuryl A Treasury of its own, unconnected with, and independent of the States. It was for this that wise and patriotic men wrote, and
spoke and prayed for the fourteen years that intervened from the declaration
of independence, in 1776, to the formation of the constitution in 1789." And
he continued, "A new surplus party will supersede the present surplus party,
as successive factions supersede each other in chaotic revolutions. They will
make Congress the quaestor of provinces, to collect money for the States to
administer." Id. at 655 and 657.
13 RicHARisoN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 66. In 1832 a bill was passed providing for the distribution among the states of the revenue from the public
lands. This was vetoed by President Jackson. He was opposed to the bill
which passed in 1836 depositing the surplus with the states, yet it was enacted
by large majorities and he signed it.
'10 BENTON, op. cit. supra note 26, at 229. Senator Dickerson of New
Jersey had in 1826 introduced a bill directing the Secretary of the Treasury
to divide among the states five million dollars annually for four years. The
bill was discussed but never passed. "This is intended as an experiment," he
said, "which, if successful, will no doubt be followed by an adoption of its
principle in a more permanent form. One object of this bill is to provide
funds in all the States, for the purposes of education and internal improvement,
by a rule which shall operate justly, equally and harmoniously throughout
every part of the Union. Another object is to transfer to the Legislatures of
the States the application of a part of the surplus funds of the General Government and thus relieve Congress from a weight of legislation, which from
its mass alone is becoming truly formidable, but much more so from its producing a concentration of power in the General Government, never intended to
be vested there by those who formed our constitution. It is not intended, by
this bill, to exercise any control over those funds, after the same have been
distributed to the States. . . ." 9 Id. at 288.
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tion of the particular surplus, denied that Congress had power gen36
erally to collect taxes and distribute them among the states.
Certainly it is improbable that the framers of the Constitution
ever anticipated that the federal government would collect taxes for
the support of the states. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the
Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." It was intended to give the federal government adequate revenue powers, which it did not possess under the
Confederation. The states could take care of their own finances; the
federal government needed its taxing powers to supply itself with
funds. This phrase, "to lay and collect taxes . . . to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States," has been one of the most controversial in the Constitution. Madison explained that the first draft of the clause gave
power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." Then
it was desired to assure power to pay the then existing debts of the
United States. In the Articles of Confederation, the expenses for
which requisitions were to be made on the states, were the "charges
of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common
defense or general welfare." Madison thought that the phraseology
about the common defense and general welfare was "regarded in
the new as in the old instrument merely as general terms, explained
and limited by the subjoined specifications; and therefore requiring
no critical attention or studied precaution," and his opinion was that
"but for the old debts and their association with the terms 'common
defense and general welfare,' the clause would have remained as reported in the first Draft of a Constitution, expressing generally a
'power in Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises'; without any addition of the phrase 'to provide for the common defence and general welfare'."13 7 Mr. Charles Warren thinks
Supra notes 23, 30, 31.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911) 483.
Madison stated this view in a letter to Andrew Stevenson, November 17, 1830.
"Consider for a moment," he wrote, "the immeasurable difference between the
Constitution limited in its powers to the enumerated objects; and expanded as
it would be by the import claimed for the phraseology in question. The difference is equivalent to two Constitutions, of characters essentially contrasted
with each other; the one possessing powers confined to certain specified, cases;
the other extended to all cases whatsoever: For what is the case that would
not be embraced by a general power to raise money, a power to provide for

13
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that the probable reason for the insertion of the phrase was that if
the clause had stopped after the addition of the words "to pay the
debts of the United States" it "might have been construed as giving
Congress the power to levy and collect taxes to pay the old debts
and only for that purpose. Some words evidently had to be added
that would make clear the power of Congress to levy taxes for all
the National purposes set forth in the grants of power subsequently
specified in this section. Evidently the Committee selected these
words 'to provide for the common defence and general welfare' as
comprising all the other purposes for which Congress was to be empowered to levy and collect taxes."3 8 That, however, has not been

the prevailing interpretation given the terms by the legislative and
executive branches of the government. The judicial branch has never

spoken.3 9 According to this opposing view, Congress may levy taxes
and appropriate money for anything that it considers to be for the
general welfare, whether or not the purpose falls within the more

particularly specified powers of Congress. 40

Upon the theory of

the general welfare, and a power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry
these powers into execution; all such provisions and laws superseding at the
same times, all local laws and constitutions at variance with them. Can less
be said with the evidence before us furnished by the Journal of the Convention
itself, than that it is impossible that such a Constitution as the latter would
have been recommended to the States by all the members of that Body whose
names are subscribed to the Instrument."
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928) 475.
In a case unrelated to taxation Chief Justice Marshall remarked, "Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes, etc., to pay the debts, and provide
for the common defence and general welfare, of the United States. This does
not interfere with the power of the States to tax for the support of their own
governments; nor is the exercise of that power by the States, an exercise of
any portion of the power that is granted to the United States. In imposing
taxes for State purposes, they are not doing what Congress is empowered to
do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within
the exclusive province of the States. When, then, each government exercises
the power of taxation, neither is exercising the power of the other." Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824).
4 See, 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1833) ch. 14;
Tucker, Judge Story's Position on the So-Called General Welfare Clause
(1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 363, 465. In his Report on Manufactures in 1791 Hamilton wrote, referring to the power to lay taxes to provide for the general
welfare, "The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have been used,
because it was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Union to appropriate its revenues should have been restricted within narrower limits than
the 'general welfare,' and because this necessarily enibraces a vast variety of
particulars which are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition.
"It is, therefore, of necessity left to the discretion of the National Legislature to pronounce upon the objects which concern the general welfare, and
for which, under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and
proper. And there seems to be no room for doubt that whatever concerns the
general interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce,
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expending money to provide for the general welfare the federal government has engaged in activities which could be justified under
other clauses of the Constitution only by straining of the imagination.
Appropriations for many of the activities of the Department of Agriculture and of the Department of Labor and appropriations for the
advancement of education, the promotion of maternity and infancy
hygiene and for vocational rehabilitation, among others, would seem
to rest on this theory.
The development of federal aid to the states for education is an
illuminating chapter in constitutional theory and legislative practice.
In 1859 the Morrill Bill, which provided for a grant of a portion of
the public lands to each state for the establishment of agricultural
colleges, passed Congress by small majorities and was vetoed by
President Buchanan on the ground that it was unconstitutional. The
measure had been supported as within the power conferred in Article
IV, Section 3 of the Constitution which says that "The Congress
shall have power to dispose of ... the territory ... belonging to the
United States. ' 41 President Buchanan answered that the power to
dispose did not mean to make gifts such as these; that Congress
might manage the lands and make grants as a prudent proprietor to
enhance the value of the remaining lands, but the establishment of
agricultural colleges in New York or Virginia would not, he said,
improve the value of public lands in California or Minnesota. 42 Two
years later the political and constitutional complexion of Congress
and the Executive had changed. The bill now passed with large
43
majorities and was signed by President Lincoln.
Next came the Hatch Act in 1887 which granted fifteen thousand
dollars a year to each state for the purpose of establishing experiment
stations in connection with the agricultural colleges." This was a
grant not of land but of money. And that seemed to be an imposition on the constitutional views of some Senators. They would conare within the sphere of the national councils, as regards an application of
money.

"The only qualification of the generality of the phrase in question, which
seems to be admissible is this: That the object to which an appropriation of
money is to be made be general, and not local; its operation extending in fact
or by possibility throughout the Union, and not being confined to a particular
spot." 4 WoRKs OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
"CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., p.

(Lodge ed.) 151.

1696; id. 2nd. Sess., p. 851.

5 RiscARsoN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 543, 550.

"312 STAT. 503 (1862).

The Act granted thirty thousand acres to each state
for each of its Senators and Representatives. Land scrip was given to the
states which did not have any of the public domain within their borders.
" 24 STAT. 440 (1887).
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cede that Congress had the power to dispose of the public domain as
it did in the Morrill Act, but to pay tax money to the states out of
the TTeasury was said to be a very different matter.4 5 So an amendment was adopted which provided that the appropriation be made
"out of any money in the Treasury proceeding from the sales of public lands." The theory was that it was now accepted that Congress
had absolute power of disposal of the public lands and consequently
over the proceeds from the sale of the lands. This amendment
permitted doubting Senators to vote for the bill and to those without constitutional doubts it was immaterial.4 6 Three years later the
second Morrill Act appropriated to each state a sum of money,
beginning with fifteen thousand dollars a year and increasing to
twenty-five thousand, for the maintenance of the agricultural colleges. 47 Again the form of appropriating money from the sale
of public lands was adopted for what it was worth. 48 In 1906
the Adams Act increased the appropriation granted the experiment stations under the Hatch Act.4 9 The understanding was that
the bill was the same as the Hatch Act, only increasing 'the amount

appropriated.50
18.

CONG.

However, the public land phraseology which had

Rc. 726, 727, 1040, 1045 (1887).

""Senator Hawley. There are many Senators who hold the view that

money raised by the ordinary forms of taxation ought not to be applied to
appropriations of this description, but they are perfectly willing to vote for
bills that shall take money for this particular purpose out of the proceeds of
the sales of public lands, holding that that is in some way different from any
other money in the Treasury as it may be said to be in trust for the general
welfare of the States of the Union. Now I conceive that it makes no possible
difference to any of us who do not hold that view; but there are some Senators here who will vote for this bill with that provision in it who will not
without it. It is their constitutional view." 18 CONG. REc. 1080 (1887) ; id.
at 1045.
126 STAT. 417 (1890).
"21 CoNG. REa 6372 (1890). It should not be thought that all Senators
considered there was a distinction between revenues from the public lands and
revenues from taxation. In the debate on the Blair Education Bill in 1890 Senator Blair protested that, "The subterfuge and pretense . . . that there is a
difference between the power of Congress to apply land, or money derived
from the sale of land, to education, and the power to apply any other money
derived from taxation, is manifestly absurd...

."

21 CoNG. REc. 1073 (1890) ;

as to
id. at 1865, 6341. In the House this view was stated: "Mr. Blount....
the constitutionality of this question, is not that a thing of the past? . . . For
instance, you have got your colleges based on the land scrip of 1862, and you
have your experiment stations based on the act of 1887; and as I understand it,
the effect of this bill is simply to increase the amount appropriated ...
Therefore we are not confronted here with the question as to whether we are
adopting this or that system, but we have it now, and this is just to extend its
operation." Id. at 8832.
" 34 STAT. 63 (1906).
0 40 CoNG. IEc. 2627 (1906).
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satisfied constitutional objectors did not appear in the new Act. In
fact the annual appropriations for carrying out the Hatch Act had
been made "out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated," abandoning the public land formality which had been
used only in securing the original passage of the Act.5 1 The next
year the Nelson Amendment in similar manner increased the appropriation for the agricultural colleges without any phraseology about
the proceeds from the sale of public lands. 52 The pretense had been
abandoned and federal aid for agricultural education was now an
accepted function of the federal government. Opponents of federal
aid continued to protest but without hope of preventing the appropriations. "I do not know of any provision in the Constitution or
any right that belongs to the Government itself that would authorize
this kind of legislation; but that has passed and gone," said Senator
Works. And Senator Brandegee added, ...
I do not think it need
surprise ... anybody ... that the Government is now proposing to
engage upon another activity which I think probably the framers of
the Constitution would have regarded as utterly outside the province of national activity. I think, however, the barriers which were
put up by the Constitution against these extra-constitutional movements, have long since been broken down." To which Senator Cummins replied, "I do not think that any barriers have been broken
down that ought to be maintained. I am glad to see the Government
of the United States enlarge its activities for the benefit and advantages of the people ....
125 STAT. 334 (1888); 26 STAT. 288 (1890); 27 STAT. 80 (1892); etc. See
remarks of Senator Blair, 21 CONG. REc. 6372 (1890).
r134 STAT.1281 (1907). A1 CONG. RFC. 3546, 4491 (1907).

1 51 CONG. REc. 2574 (1914). These remarks occurred during debate on
the Smith-Lever Act. In the discussion of the Sheppard-Towner Bill Senator
Thomas said: "A man is a fool who in the Congress of the United States
questions the constitutionality of any bill these days. He only provokes ridicule, if not pity and contempt. What is the Constitution between appropriation
bills and their exponents? What does it amount to in the face of an overwhelming petition of those who are interested in a given measure? In the first
place, there will be very few who will question it in the courts unless it immediately concerns them and in the next place any and everything seems to be
in the power of the Federal Congress that the judgment, the whim, or the
caprice of our several Members seem to think desirable. So I shall say nothing
about the constitutionality of the measure beyond asserting that in my judgment if such legislation as this had been supposed even a remote fantastic
possibility in the early days the Constitution of the United States would never
have been ratified." 60 CONG. Rrc 420 (1920).
In regard to the same measure Senator Pittman's view was: "The States
should provide the appropriations and the means of educating the people with
regard to the matters provided in this bill; but few of the States have done it,
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The Smith-Lever Act in 1914 provided for federal aid to the
states for agricultural extension work."4 In 1917 the Smith-Hughes
Act provided aid for vocational education.5 The Fess-Kenyon Act
in 1920 provided aid for vocational rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry. 56 And the next year the Sheppard-Towner Act
furnished aid to the states for the education of women in maternity
and infancy hygiene. 57 All of these measures in recent years were
enacted by sizeable majorities, and when proponents have the necessary votes they generally do not discuss constitutional questions at
length. The view usually stated was that legislation of this sort was
of long standing and the question of its constitutionality was a thing
of the past.58 Only rarely was the power to levy taxes to provide
and the death and disease that is spreading throughout the whole country by
reason of this failure of State action is affecting every State, and therefore it
is the duty of the Federal Government to act. It is forced on the Federal
Government, and it does not lie in the mouth of any Stafe rights man or the
governor of any State or the people of any State to complain against this
legislation when the conditions that require the legislation are due to the negligence of those same complainants." Id. at 456. See 53 CoNG. REc. 1379
(1916) ; 61 CONG. Ric. 7984 (1921).
1'38 STAT. 372 (1914).
139 STAT. 929 (1917).
"41 STAT. 735 (1920).
142 STAT. 224 (1921). The original act authorized an annual appropriation
for five years. When the question of extending the work was ,before the
Senate in 1927 it appears that opponents conducted a filibuster and a compromise agreement to extend the work for two years was reached and entire repeal
of the act was to take place in 1929. 68 Cong. §1585 (1927).
' In the Sheppard-Towner discussion Senator Walsh of Montana said:
"Mr. President, I am in sympathy with the principles of this measure and
want to give the bill my support. I am not seriously troubled about the question of power with respect to legislation of this character. It is true there is
no express delegation of power in the Federal Constitution to the Congress of
the United States to deal with a subject of this character. Neither is there
any such delegation of power over the subject of education. That was reposed,
under our kind of government, in the States. Understanding that fact from
the very beginning of the Government Congress has been making grants of
public lands to the States in the interest of education. I believe those grants
began with the very beginning of oui Government and have gone on at intervals ever since, and I am entirely unable to distinguish in principle between
the grant of public lands from the Government to the States in aid of education, which lands might have been sold for cash and the cash turned into the
Treasury, and the grant of money outright for the purpose of aiding the
States in their work of education. The practice has gone on too long; it has
become sanctioned by usage to such an extent that I apprehend no one at this
day would be heard to say that it is beyond the scope of the powers of the
Federal Government to vote aid to the States for the purpose of carrying on
the work of education. Mr. President, if the Government may thus make
grants of land or of money to the States for the purpose of educating children,
it would be difficult to establish that it has not the power to grant aid, either
in money or land, to aid in bringing children into existence, and that is the
purpose of this bill, as I understand it." 60 CONG. REc. 461 (1920). See 54
CoNG. R.Ec. 716 (1916) ; 58 CoNa.RFxG 6656 (1919).
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for the general welfare enunciated as the justification for Congressional action. 59
The nature of these-federal subsidies to the states for the promotion of agricultural extension work, vocational education, vocational
rehabilitation and maternity and infancy hygiene should be considered in relation to the proposal for federal collection and distribution. 60 They have been grants of money from the federal treasury
for the purpose of aiding the states in carrying on specified projects.
Their enjoyment by a state has been conditioned upon the state's
appropriating funds to match the federal allotment and their expenditure by the state in compliance with federal standards. 61 The
points of similarity to the suggested federal collection and distribution of taxes are that the distributed funds come from federal revenues, that the use of the money is by the state government, and that
receipt of the funds is upon condition. In the one case the condition
is that the state match the federal funds and utilize them according
to federal standards and in the other case the condition is that the
state refrain from levying certain taxes. They are dissimilar mainly
in that the grants so far have been to aid particular activities which
presumably the federal government could undertake alone, while the
proposed distribution is a subsidizing of state government generally.
Assuming that Congress may levy taxes and make appropriations for
projects such as vocational rehabilitation on the theory of providing
for the general welfare, may it go the further distance and levy taxes
for distribution to the states to do with as they see fit? Is that levying taxes to provide for the general welfare? By a constitutional
'

Congressman Barkley had stated that the Sheppard-Towner Bill was con-

stitutional under the general welfare clause.

He was asked by Congressman

Layton: "Can we not just as readily-and I would like to have a categorical

answer- just as easily, under the general-welfare clause of the Constitution,

have a bureau in Washington for the foodless, another bureau for the clothes-

less, another bureau for the houseless. . . ?" Congressman Barkley: "I am
inclined to think that under the general-welfare clause Congress could do all

of those things without violating the Constitution. Whether it desires to do

them is another question.
'Federal

. . ." 61 CONG. REc. 7932 (1921).
aid to the states for highways, for forest fire prevention, and for

the national guard are not here considered since this aid would seem to rest
securely upon other clauses of the Constitution: the power to regulate interstate commerce and to establish post roads, in the case of aid for highways;
the power to make needful rules and regulations respecting the public domain,
and the power to regulate interstate commerce, in the case of aid for forest
fire prevention; and the power to provide for the militia.
See, MACDONALD, FEDERAL AID (1928) ; KEITH AND BAGLEY, THE NATION
AND THE SCHOOLS (1920) ; Burdick, Federal Aid Legislation (1923) 8 CORN.

L. Q. 324; Corwin, Thd Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternity

Act (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 548.
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test which imagines what the framers considered a proper federal
expenditure this proposal must fail. For it is most unlikely that
even Alexander Harhilton ever intended that the general welfare
should be so provided for. 62 But if the view is taken that the general
welfare is whatever Congress determines it to be, then it should be
constitutional for Congress to levy taxes to distribute to the states if
it considered that the general welfare would thereby be benefitted.
One of the causes behind the proposed federal collection and distribution is that the independent utilization of the same forms of
taxes by the state and federal governments impairs the revenue yield
for both. Under the Constitution the federal government and the
states are largely free to use the same methods of taxation. 63 They
are free to fix their rates without regard to what the other is doing.
The combined amounts of the federal tax and the state tax on the
sale of a commodity may be such that the sale will be severely restricted and this source of revenue to that extent lost to both governments. And too, this curtailment in business activity produces a
decrease in revenue from income taxation. The development of
state taxes on tobacco in addition to the federal tax motivated the
Doughton resolution for sharing the cigarette receipts with states
which would refrain from taxing this commodity. The states have
been assured that the federal tax on gasoline is an emergency measure and that this field will be left to them as soon as the federal government can find some other way to meet its expenses.0 4 Should
the federal government be forced to continue this tax it may find
that a control over the total tax burden on gasoline will enable it to
improve the yield. The possibility that independently developed state
and federal liquor tax rates might result in the continuance of bootPerhaps, however, Hamilton would not have been averse to such an expenditure.

Madison's Journal on June 19, 1787 records that Col. Hamilton

said: "He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of the States,
he meant that no boundary could be drawn between the National and State
Legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. If it
were limited at all, the rivalship of the States would gradually subvert it.
Even as Corporations the extent of some of them as Virginia, Massachusetts,
etc., would be formidable. As States, he thought they ought to be abolished.
But he admitted tl~e necessity of leaving in them, subordinate jurisdictions. ..
1 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 37, at 323. Supra note 40.
Congress is forbidden to tax exports (Art. I, §9, cl. 5) ; and the requirement that direct taxes be apportioned according to population (Art. I, §9,. cl.
4) is, in effect, a prohibition on property taxes. The states may not tax imports or exports or tonnage without the consent of Congress (Art. I, §10, cl.

2, 3).
O'Stpra note 10;

HEARINGS ON REVENUE REVISION

WAYs AND MEANS, at

821.

(1934) ComMITTEE oN
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legging as a profitable enterprise was presented to a Congressional
committee, where an arrangement for federal sharing of the liquor
tax was urged. 65 Can a constitutional justification for federal collection and distribution be found in the necessity for the federal government to protect its revenues?
The Doughton resolution appears to have been drafted with this
idea. The preamble states that it is a resolution, "To preserve and
stabilize the revenue to the United States derived from the sale of
cigarettes, and for other purposes. Whereas several of the States
have levied taxes on cigarettes which have impaired the sales of
cigarettes and have contributed to a reduction in the revenue of the
Federal Government; and whereas it is necessary to bring about an
adjustment between the taxing.programs of the Federal Government
and the States in order to protect the revenues of the Federal Government; and, whereas it is in the interest of the general welfare of
the people of the United States that the taxes on cigarettes be stabilized; therefore, be it resolved... ."66 Before the Constitution was
ratified the contention was made that the power of Congress to tax
might be used to exclude the states from the exercise of their concurrent taxing power. Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, thus
stated the argument before he undertook to refute it: "As the laws
of the union are to become the supreme law of the land; as it is to
have power to pass all laws that may be necessary for carrying into
execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it; the
national government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for
state objects, upon the pretence of an interference with its own. It
might allege a necessity of doing this, in order to give efficacy to the
national revenues; and thus all the resources of taxation might by
degrees, become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire ex' 7
clusion and destruction of the state governments."C
Such an attempt
to abridge the powers of the states, Hamilton said, would be an
'Supra note 14.
'Supra note 13.
'THE FEDERALIST (1842 ed.) No. 31, at 138. Edmund Randolph, speaking
in the Virginia convention, said: "I had an objection which pressed heavily on
my mind-I was solicitous to know the objects of taxation. I wished to make
some discrimination with regard to the demands of Congress, and of the states,
on the same object. As neither can restrain the other in this case; as the
power of both is unlimited, it will be their interest mutually to avoid inter-

ferences.

It will most certainly be the interest of either to avoid imposing a

tax on an article, which shall have been previously taxed by the other. This
consideration, and the structure of the government satisfy me." 3 FARRAND,
op. cit. mtpra note 37, at 309.
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assumption of power, unwarranted by any clause of the Constitution.
As the Constitution had restrained the states from imposing duties
on imports and exports, this implied, he said, that the authority of
the states to levy all other forms of taxes remained undiminished.
He hoped that the mutual interests of the states and the federal government would lead them to refrain from overburdening a revenue
source, but he saw nothing in the Constitution which would permit
the federal government to control state taxes. 68 The decisions are
replete with statements that the taxing power of the states is "an
essential function of government," "an attribute of sovereignty," and
"is indispensable to the existence of the state." 69 Yet consider the
fate of this power in an instance where it has conflicted with the federal taxing power. A federal statute provides that "whenever any
person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the
estate of any deceased debtor in the hands of executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased,
the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied." ° It has
been held that under this statute taxes owed to the United States
have a priority over taxes owed to the states, and that it is within the
power of Congress thus to provide. 71 And it is so held because the
Constitution gives Congress the power to levy and collect taxes and
says that the laws made in pursuance of the Constitution are the supreme law of the land. That, it seems, is very close to what Hamilton assured the adversaries of the Constitution would be an unwarranted assumption of power. To secure the federal revenue the
states were forced to yield. If Congress has the power to subordinate state claims to those of the federal Treasury in order to protect
its finances it should have the power to collect taxes for distribution
to the states if that is necessary to safeguard the federal revenue.
The suggested plan does not purport to go the limit of Hamilton's
hypothesis and forbid the states to levy taxes on subjects selected
by the federal government. The states would be at liberty to continue their tobacco taxes or any of the others, but if they did they
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would not share in the distribution. If the Doughton resolution is
constitutional as a needful measure to protect the federal revenue
from tobacco, the proposal in its more comprehensive form should be
valid though these other tax sources may not be endangered at present or may not even be the subject of federal taxation, since a comprehensive distribution may be necessary for the success of any
distribution scheme.
Of course the proposal is designed as much if not more for the
benefit of the states' revenues as for those of the nation. The states
have as much to gain from the elimination of interstate tax competition as is to be gained for the nation and the states from a controlled fiscal system which prevents double taxation. The states are
in a more precarious financial condition than the nation and their inability to finance themselves adequately has recently required that the
federal government finance activities formerly regarded as more properly a field for state government. These should not at the present
time be considered improper federal expenditures since they might be
necessary to sustain the Constitution itself. In order to relieve itself
of these additional burdens the federal government may have to assist
the states by some plan which removes the causes of inadequate state
revenues. One suggestion for the elimination of tax competition
among the states is for an extension of the federal estate tax credit
clause to other forms of taxes. 72 Another is the proposal for federal
collection and distribution. In such an undertaking the proposal
should be constitutional.
The constitutionality of federal aid has never been passed upon
by the courts. Attempts to contest the Sheppard-Towner Act for
promoting maternity and infancy hygiene were made in two cases,
Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v.Melon73 The two
suits, one by a state for herself and as representative of her citizens,
the other by an individual taxpayer, were both brought' to enjoin the
Secretary of the Treasury and other officials from carrying out the
statute. Both suits were dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the
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merits of the constitutional questions involved were not considered.

The position of Massachusetts was stated to be that the appropriation
was for local and not national purposes and that the legislation
usurped the powers of the states. Mr. Justice Sutherland observed
for a unanimous court that nothing was to be done under the legislation without the consent of the state and that the question as presented was a political and not a judicial question. So the state could
not maintain the suits in its own behalf. Nor could it sue as the representative of its citizens since they were also citizens of the United
States and in their relations with the federal government the United
States and not Massachusetts stood in the position of parens patriae.
The suit of Mrs. Frothingham was dismissed because an individual
taxpayer's interest in the money in the federal Treasury was considered minute and indeterminable and the possibility of future injurious
effect on her tax bill was considered too remote to be the basis of a
suit in equity.
One section of the Doughton resolution would impose a tax on
cigarettes and the next section would direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to allocate and pay to the states one-sixth of the amount
collected under the first section.1 4 This it would seem is altogether
different from the statute challenged in the Frotingham case. That
was an appropriation statute alone; whereas the Doughton resolution
would impose a tax and would provide that part of it should be paid
to the states. Though it seems that practically all ways are blocked
to test an appropriation of funds in general, it should not be difficult
to get into court with a statute which levies a tax for an alleged unconstitutional purpose. The taxpayer, here the cigarette manufacturer, could pay the tax under protest and sue to recover since onesixth of the particular tax he was forced to pay was to go for the
alleged illegal purpose of distribution to the states. Whether it would
be to the best interest of the cigarette manufacturer to contest the
statute is a different question. Suppose that instead of levying a tax
for distribution, one statute levied the tax and an independent statute
provided that the Secretary of the Treasury should distribute a specified amount of money-not from any particular source of revenueto states which refrained from taxing tobacco. This would be analogous to the Frothinghamcase. Were it desirable to avoid a contest of a distribution statute that sort of arrangement might be
helpful.
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THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO LEVY TAXES

349

It is believed that it is not desirable to try to prevent a test of the
constitutionality of federal aid for particular projects or of federal
collection of taxes and distribution to the states. There should be a
decision on the merits of the power of Congress to levy taxes to provide for the general welfare. It is very unlikely that the federal government of 1789 had the constitutional power to levy taxes for distribution to the states but it is just as probable that such a procedure is
within the constitutional power of the federal government of 1934,
for the Constitution today of course is that of 1789 plus nearly a
century and a half of growth.

